Tuesday, October 13, 2026
From a paper by Sergio De Nardis:
“The dichotomy between Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) and national deflators in international comparisons of real variables (GDP per capita and productivity) has returned to center stage in the recent debate on the gap between the EU and the US. This dichotomy does not only concern comparisons between structurally different countries. It is also present, to a lesser but still significant extent, in Europe and with reference to the Italian economy. This paper shows how, over the period 2005-2023, Italy’s productivity performance compared to Germany and France is better if GDP is measured in PPPs (output side) rather than deflated with implicit prices from national accounts. The two types of measurement lead to dynamics that are difficult to reconcile. Examining the PPP-deflator gap, it is clear that this difference does not depend on the composition and structure of the weights used in constructing PPPs. Analysis of the expenditure categories that make up GDP and analysis of the specific household consumption items reveal a pervasive phenomenon, affecting both tradable and non-tradable products. It is argued that the structural similarity of economies lends robustness to PPPs. It is concluded that comparisons between countries under consideration based on data deflated with implicit prices from national accounts are less reliable, even in time series, than those based on PPPs due to the heterogeneous approaches of statistical offices in accounting for the quality of goods and services, the different granularity of underlying information, and the fixed structure of relative prices across economies.”
From a paper by Sergio De Nardis:
“The dichotomy between Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) and national deflators in international comparisons of real variables (GDP per capita and productivity) has returned to center stage in the recent debate on the gap between the EU and the US. This dichotomy does not only concern comparisons between structurally different countries. It is also present, to a lesser but still significant extent, in Europe and with reference to the Italian economy.
Posted by at 10:59 AM
Labels: Inclusive Growth
Saturday, October 10, 2026
On cross-country:
Working papers and conferences:
On China:
On Australia and New Zealand:
On other countries:
On cross-country:
Posted by at 5:00 AM
Labels: Uncategorized
Friday, October 9, 2026
On prices, rent, and mortgage:
On sales, permits, starts, and supply:
On other developments:
On prices, rent, and mortgage:
Posted by at 5:00 AM
Labels: Global Housing Watch
Saturday, October 3, 2026
On cross-country:
Working papers and conferences:
On Australia and New Zealand:
On other countries:
On cross-country:
Working papers and conferences:
Posted by at 5:00 AM
Labels: Global Housing Watch
Friday, October 2, 2026
From a paper by Camilo Granados and Zhe (Jasmine) Jiang:
“Prudential regulation is designed for financial stability, yet the credit cycles it leans against fall unevenly across households—leaving its distributional footprint an open and contested question. Tracing that footprint across advanced, emerging, and developing economies over 1999–2024, we find that tighter macroprudential policy lowers income inequality, gradually and most clearly through the instruments that bear on banks rather than borrowers, and more so for inequality measured after taxes and transfers. To understand why, we build a closed-economy model with financial frictions and capital-skill complementarity in which prudential policy taxes the returns to intermediation. A tightening reduces inequality through three channels: it rebates revenue to households, cools the credit boom feeding financial rents, and compresses the skill premium accruing to high-income agents. Inequality moderation thus arises as a by-product of stability-oriented regulation—regulators tempering the distributional consequences of the credit cycle even when they only pursue financial stability.”
From a paper by Camilo Granados and Zhe (Jasmine) Jiang:
“Prudential regulation is designed for financial stability, yet the credit cycles it leans against fall unevenly across households—leaving its distributional footprint an open and contested question. Tracing that footprint across advanced, emerging, and developing economies over 1999–2024, we find that tighter macroprudential policy lowers income inequality, gradually and most clearly through the instruments that bear on banks rather than borrowers, and more so for inequality measured after taxes and transfers.
Posted by at 7:45 AM
Labels: Inclusive Growth
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