The Unassuming Economist

From a post by Tim Hirschel-Burns:

“2025 admittedly presents a dubious landscape for achieving substantive global economic governance reforms. The scale of needs is large—achieving development and climate goals demands trillions more in annual financing and a reorientation of our economic system—while our political context is trending in the wrong direction, with countries cutting international investments and geopolitical tensions deterring international cooperation.

Still, making progress matters. On climate change, every fraction of a degree makes a difference, and the scale of development challenges are so large that even small increases in inclusive growth or public service provision can improve the lives of millions of people. Actions taken now can also set the stage for more ambitious reforms when circumstances become more favorable in the future.

So, what are five realistic goals for global economic governance in 2025?

1. Establish principles for MDB resource needs reviews and initiate them at each MDB

Right now, decisions on multilateral development banks’ (MDBs) financing capacity are largely driven by inertia and political whims, rather than a regular, evidence-based assessment of how their ability to provide finance matches up with the financing needed to meet goals and the international community. Resource needs reviews would change that, and they are one of the key recommendations of the Group of 20 (G20) Roadmap on Better, Bigger, and More Effective MDBs, which G20 leaders endorsed in November.

That Roadmap sets a near-term goal of establishing principles for resource needs reviews, and South Africa can push for these principles to be decided under its G20 presidency next year. The G20 can simultaneously push MDBs to each initiate their own resource needs review—in the World Bank’s case, the 2025 shareholding review provides a moment to launch an assessment of its capital needs. Carrying out these reviews will generate an analysis of what mix of capital adequacy reforms, hybrid capital and capital increases would add up to financing needs, putting MDBs on a strong footing to increase the supply of finance..”

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From Devdiscourse:

“The latest Kenya Economic Update by the World Bank, prepared by a multidisciplinary team including the Macroeconomics, Trade, and Investment team, examines Kenya’s economic trajectory in a challenging global context. Global growth reached 2.6 percent in 2023, with Sub-Saharan Africa’s real GDP projected to accelerate to 4 percent by 2025-26. Kenya’s economic growth, however, has slowed to 4.7 percent in 2024 from 5.6 percent in 2023, reflecting pressures from severe floods, subdued business sentiment post-protests, and fiscal consolidation. While Kenya has made progress with inflation control and a stronger currency, persistent fiscal deficits, high debt levels, and constrained public spending weigh on its long-term growth potential. Despite improved foreign reserves and macroeconomic stabilization, achieving sustainable development remains a complex challenge.

Fiscal Pressures and the Weight of Debt

Kenya’s fiscal landscape is characterized by significant revenue underperformance and growing debt servicing costs. The fiscal deficit, though narrowed to 5.2 percent of GDP in 2023/24, remains above the target of 4.7 percent, driven by lower-than-expected revenue collections from VAT and departmental fees. This shortfall has limited the government’s capacity for social and developmental investments. Kenya’s debt burden remains high, with domestic debt now comprising the majority of its liabilities, reflecting increased reliance on local borrowing. High domestic borrowing not only crowds out private-sector investment but also adds to fiscal pressures. Although the government has introduced tax reforms and expenditure rationalization policies, implementation gaps and socio-political challenges have hindered meaningful progress.”

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From The Grumpy Economist:

“I wrote this essay on Bob Hall and Consumption (link goes to pdf on my webpage) for the conference in honor of Bob Hall at Hoover, November 22. It turned into a more extended history of some trends in macroeconomics, which any student of macroeconomics might find useful. Why we do what we do is often obscure. If this post exceeds your email limit, finish on the website at grumpy-economist.com

Bob Hall and Consumption1

I’m going to cover just two of Bob Hall’s many pathbreaking papers, “Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle–Permanent Income Hypothesis,” Hall (1978), and “Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption,” Hall (1988), both in the Journal of Political Economy. Along the way, this turns in to a brief history of the emergence of modern macroeconomics, and one of its central unsolved problems, intertemporal substitution.

I titled my remarks at the conference, “Consuming Hall at Chicago.” I think you know Hall has many fans at Stanford, but you might not know just how popular Bob was at Chicago. Pretty much everything I write today I learned from Bob Lucas and Lars Hansen at Chicago in the 1980s.

1 A Simple Idea

As usual for Bob, it all starts with a simple clever idea. In asset pricing, price is present value of dividends, so price follows a random walk. In the permanent income model, consumption is proportional to the present value of income. So consumption should follow a random walk too. Why not test that hypothesis just as asset pricers were doing in the 1970s, by running regressions,”

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From a paper by Marek Szturo, Bogdan Włodarczyk, George H. Ionescu, Daniela Firoiu, and  Vitor Braga:

“The commodity market is a key element of the global economy. It is influenced by the political and economic situation of the major participants on the supply and demand side, as exemplified by the geopolitical and economic situation related to the conflict in Ukraine. Another aspect of this influence is the close relationship between commodity markets and financial markets. Both factors contribute to the possibility of the commodity market becoming subject to contagion, resulting in the transfer of supply and demand shocks and volatility. The aim of this article is to identify the commodities that are the source of contagion (volatility) during the transmission of shocks and the increase of systematic risk in selected periods. Combining traditional network theory with vector autoregression (VAR) model, we aim to estimate systemic linkages as a measure of systemic risk and the contagion process underlying it. We used time series of commodity returns from the Refinitiv Eikon database to observe the relationships between commodities during crisis periods, starting from 2006. The results suggest that the commodities with the largest increase in volatility transmission compared to the pre-crisis period acted as a transmission gate for market shocks.”

From a paper by Luccas Assis Attílio, and André Varella Mollick:

“We investigate the effects of oil price shocks on industrial and emerging market economies. We use a global vector autoregressive (GVAR) model with 19 economies from 1999M1 to 2022M3. Our sample evaluates output responses of each country to the same global shock, defined in several ways. While we find that domestic prices and interest rates in industrial economies respond to the WTI real oil price shock, the generalized impulse response functions (GIRF) tend to be not statistically significant in emerging economies. Stock markets increase in the first months for the oil producers but have negative values in the long-run. The oil price shock causes a generalized fall in industrial production and loses importance over time. We reinforce our results by identifying the oil shock using the structural GIRF (SGIRF) following a causal ordering from oil to real output. When we decompose WTI into either supply or demand shocks, industrial production declines in the short-run due to supply shocks but increases in response to oil demand shocks. Our results are very robust, especially in industrial economies when allowing for time-varying bilateral trade. Underscoring the importance of identifying oil price shocks, the oil price shock pushes inflation up, prompting the central bank’s response in policy rates.”