The Unassuming Economist

From ECONOFACT:

“The Issue:

Consumer prices rose 7 percent between December 2020 and December 2021, the third month in a row that this year-to-year inflation rate exceeded 6 percent.  This December figure is the largest 12-month increase in 40 years. A central concern now is whether inflation will be transitory or, instead, we are entering a persistently high-inflation period, like what occurred in the 1970s. The proximate causes of current inflation include supply chain disruptions, labor shortages and pent-up consumer spending. But another important source of ongoing high inflation is an expectation of high inflation among households and businesses.  How does the expectation of high inflation become self-fulfilling, and what proxies do we have to reflect this inherently unobservable but very important economic variable?

The Facts:

One source of inflation is when spending by people and companies strains the economy’s capacity for providing goods and services. Strains on the economy’s productive capacity can arise because of an increase in demand, constrictions to supply, or some combination of these two factors.  Currently in the United States and other developed countries it is the combination of high demand and constrained supply that is feeding inflationary pressures. Demand in the United States was supported through the first year-and-a-half of the pandemic by government support programs. Cash payments to individuals and families under the CARES act of March 2020, the CARES Supplemental Appropriations Act of December 2020 and the American Rescue Plan of March 2021 contributed to sharp increases in personal disposable income.  Spending may also have been boosted by low interest rates, which have increased the value of stocks, houses and other assets. Supply has been constrained because of a  2 percentage point drop in the share of the population participating in the labor force (either working or looking for a job).”

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The COVID-19 pandemic brought with it numerous travel and immigration-related restrictions throughout the globe. For the USA, this translated into a shortfall of nearly 2 million working-age immigrants compared to how many there would have been if the pre-2020 immigration trend had continued unchanged. 

Metadata within this shows that out of these 2 million immigrants nearly one million would have been college graduates, implying a loss to the US labor market in terms of skilled workers, entrepreneurs, and a huge loss to American Universities which annually attract several foreign students. The drop in numbers of highly-skilled immigrants is significant due to its “long-run effects on productivity, innovation, and entrepreneurship”. The blog sheds light on these and several such issues.

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From a VoxEU post by Oleg Itskhoki and Dmitry Mukhin:

“The Mussa puzzle refers to the existence of a large and sudden jump in the volatility of the real exchange rate after the adoption of a floating exchange rate regime in 1973. It is a central piece of evidence in favour of monetary non-neutrality. In contrast to conventional wisdom, this column argues that the puzzle cannot be explained with sticky prices, and instead provides strong evidence in favour of monetary transmission via the financial market. This has important consequences for the design of optimal monetary and exchange rate policy.

What is the most convincing evidence that monetary shocks affect real outcomes? When Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) surveyed prominent macroeconomists, “the three most common answers were: the evidence presented in Friedman and Schwartz (1963) regarding the role of monetary policy in the severity of the Great Depression; the Volcker disinflation of the early 1980s and accompanying twin recession; and the sharp break in the volatility of the US real exchange rate accompanying the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System of fixed exchange rates in 1973”.  This third fact, famously documented by Mussa (1986), is especially appealing as it relies on a simple and clear identification of the causal real effect from a shift in monetary policy: a large and discontinuous change in the nominal exchange rate process makes it hard to attribute the increased volatility of the real exchange rate to any other factors (see Figure 1)

What is missing from this narrative, however, is that there was no simultaneous change in the properties of other macro variables – neither nominal like inflation, nor real like consumption and output (Baxter and Stockman 1989, Flood and Rose 1995, and Figure 2). One could interpret this as an extreme form of neutrality, where a major shift in the monetary regime, which increases the volatility of the nominal exchange rate by an order of magnitude, does not affect the equilibrium properties of any macro variables, apart from the real exchange rate. In fact, this is a considerably more puzzling part of the larger set of ‘Mussa facts’ summarised in Figures 1 and 2. In a recent paper, we argue that this evidence points to a particular unconventional transmission mechanism of monetary policy and has important normative implications for both open and closed economies (Itskhoki and Mukhin 2021b).”

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From Conversable Economist:

“The Federal Reserve Bank of New York puts out a monthly publication called “U.S. Economy in a Snapshot,” a compilation of figures and short notes about the most recently available major macroeconomic statistics. As we take a deep breath and head into 2022, it seemed a useful time to consult pass along some these figures as as a way of showing the path of the US economy since the two-month pandemic recession of March and April 2020.

Here’s the path of GDP growth. It has clearly bounced back from the worse of the recession, but it still remains about 2% below the trend-line from before the recession occurred.

Part of the reason why GDP has not rebounded more fully lies in what is being called the “Great Resignation”–that is, people who left the workforce during the pandemic and have not returned. Just to be clear, to be counted as officially “unemployed” you need to be both out of a job and actively looking for a job. If you are out of a job but not looking, then you are “out of the labor force.” Thus, you can see that while the unemployment rate based on those out of a job and actively looking for work is back down to pre-pandemic levels, the labor force participation rate–which combines those who have job and the unemployed who are looking–has not fully rebounded. A smaller share of the labor force working will typically translate into a smaller GDP. When or if these potential workers return to the workforce will have a big effect on the future evolution of the economy and public policy.”

As described by the tagline of this blog post, it dives deeper into CPI figures for the USA for December 2021 and then discusses their implications. CPI rose by 7 percent year on year in December and 0.5 percent since November 2021, although the rise in demand causing it wasn’t all uniform. The pattern of uneven growth of consumer expenditure on manufactured goods and durables rather than services has been discussed in greater detail, besides issues like inhouse oil production in the US which also exert some influence on the general price level.

Looking ahead, it elaborates upon visible signs that signal a quickly abating inflation using measures like wage growth, prevailing inflation expectations in the market, and the state of aggregate spending in the economy.

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