The Unassuming Economist

From Econofact:

“The Issue:

The price of housing has a special importance because housing is both a basic necessity and a key component of wealth. Around the start of the pandemic, some experts predicted a protracted collapse in housing prices and the housing market. For example, in April 2020 the staff at Freddie Mac projected home prices would fall by 0.5 percent over the next year. In fact, the opposite happened: The Case Shiller National Home Price Index rose by 15 percent between April 2020 and April 2021 while home sales hit a 15 year high in the calendar year 2021. This stands in stark contrast to the Great Recession when the price index fell 44 percent between May 2007 and May 2009. But one similarity across the Great Recession and the COVID downturn is the wide differences in housing price changes across different parts of the United States. What has happened to housing prices during the COVID pandemic and why?  And what are the broader economic implications of this?

The Facts:

House sales and housing construction fell at the outset of the pandemic in March 2020. The total housing inventory on the market, including newly constructed houses and those being resold, was down 10.2 percent between March 2019 and March 2020. Between February 2020 and March 2020 housing starts declined by 22.3 percent, perhaps reflecting builders’ bleak expectations for future demand. Total existing-home sales fell 8.5 percent in March 2020 compared with the prior month and tumbled a further 17.8 percent in April.”

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From the IMF’s latest report on Finland:

“The increase and changing composition of household debt continues to pose borrower-side vulnerabilities. Pre-pandemic, real estate prices were not overvalued, but household debt was increasing (although still low relative to Nordic peers). Much of this new debt was in the form of housing company loans—loans that finance buying shares of a housing company that may be connected to a specific apartment instead of purchasing it directly—which mask risk exposures for households. Unsecured consumer credit was also on the rise. As the pandemic struck, the authorities relaxed loan-to-collateral (LTC) requirements for housing loans. This was accompanied by an increase in highly leveraged borrowing, and housing valuations rose throughout Finland. Housing price growth has begun to moderate somewhat in the second half of 2021.

(…)

The authorities are taking steps to mitigate vulnerabilities in household finances. Following the recent increase in highly leveraged mortgage borrowing, the authorities tightened the LTC limit to pre-pandemic levels. Parliament will discuss in the spring of 2022 a draft bill on borrower-based macroprudential tools including maturity limits for housing and housing company loans, and loan-to-value (LTV) limits for housing company loans (a debt-to-income (DTI) cap was removed from the draft bill due to strong industry and political opposition). Additionally, an electronic registry of housing company shares should be operational by end-2022, making it easier to assess risks of investing in housing companies. But implementation of the planned comprehensive credit registry has been delayed to 2024 due to technical constraints.

Staff recommend that more steps be taken to enhance the macroprudential toolkit and strengthen macrofinancial resilience. The macroprudential toolkit could be enhanced further to include: (i) a DTI cap in line with recommendations from the government-appointed working group and reflecting growing household debt vulnerabilities; and (ii) supplementing the DTI cap with a debt-service-to-income cap once the new comprehensive credit registry is operational. Features of the tax code that create incentives for investors to favor housing company loans should be addressed so as to mitigate compositional changes in household debt (the recent MOF review concluded that separating the treatment of housing company shareholders’ loans’ amortization costs from interest and other expenses could help balance incentives). In this context, data relating to consumer credit and housing companies should be improved.”

From a new report by Daniela Gabor and Sebastian Kohl:

“Over the past decades, institutional landlords – from real estate companies like the German giant Vonovia to private equity companies like Blackstone, or pension funds like ABP, the Dutch pension fund for government and education employees – have minted EUR 40bn of Berlin’s houses into assets that they rent out. This is roughly double the combined value of London’s and Amsterdam’s institutionally owned houses and it is a trend that has accelerated since the COVID19 pandemic. Europe’s residential real estate has become an attractive asset class for investors worldwide, supported by a range of government policies that are ostensibly aimed at homeowners: support for housing markets pushes up house prices and reduces affordability for citizens, whereas income support for rent-paying households ensures stable returns for investors.

In response, citizens across Europe – from Berlin to Dublin and Madrid – have mobilized to pressure governments into taking action. From rent controls to better regulation or even expropriation of institutional landlords, the political tide seems to be turning against a decades-old phenomenon known as the financialization of housing. A mega-trend across housing markets everywhere, it can be understood as (1) the disproportionate growth of housing finance relative to the underlying housing economy or (2) the turn to Housing as an Asset Class (HAC), captured by the increasing for-profit and financial orientation of actors in housing markets, and encouraged in Europe by a broad range of European-level financial legislation.

In this report, we explore the growing importance of institutional landlords such as Blackstone, focusing in particular on the mechanisms through which European legislation has accommodated their strategies to transform housing into asset classes. We use data from the private provider Preqin to map the complex financial ecosystem behind private equity landlords. We then propose a set of reforms that would de financialize housing for the public good.”

From a NBER paper by Hanming Fang, Jing Wu, Rongjie Zhang and Li-An Zhou:

“We advance a novel hypothesis that China’s recent anti-corruption campaign may have contributed to the recent resurgence of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China as an unintended consequence. We explore the nexus between the anti-corruption campaign and the SOE resurgence by presenting supporting evidence from the Chinese real estate sector, which is notorious for pervasive rent-seeking and corruption. We use a unique data set of land parcel transactions merged with firm-level registration information and a difference-in-differences empirical design to show that, relative to the industrial land parcels which serve as the control, the fraction of residential land parcels purchased by SOEs increased significantly relative to that purchased by private developers after the anti-corruption campaign. This finding is robust to a set of alternative specifications. We interpret the findings through the lens of a model where we show, since selling land to private developers carries the stereotype that the city official may have received bribes, even the “clean” local officials will become more willing to award land to SOEs despite the presence of more efficient competing private developers. We find evidence consistent with the model predictions.”

From the IMF’s latest report on China:

“One of China’s largest property developers, Evergrande, has begun restructuring talks with offshore creditors to alleviate rising financial stress following a tightening of regulations to rein in the highly-leveraged real estate sector. Funding pressures have since spread to other property developers, posing concerns of negative spillovers to the broader economy and global markets.2 The authorities have the policy space and tools to contain these risks but will have to balance difficult trade-offs between financial stability and moral hazard. Over the long term, deeper structural reforms are needed to comprehensively address the risks from China’s property market.

Evergrande, one of China’s largest property developers, has entered restructuring negotiations amid severe funding strains. With over US$300 billion in liabilities to creditors, suppliers, and households, the company’s bond prices are trading at distressed levels. So far, contagion has spread mostly to other financially weak developers and lower-rated corporates in China, with limited impact on higher-rated developers. Markets in and outside of China initially reacted strongly to Evergrande’s stress but subsequently stabilized following actions by the authorities to limit wider spillovers.

Evergrande’s troubles follow a broad regulatory campaign to rein in China’s highly leveraged real estate sector. Property plays a large role in both China’s economy and financial system, accounting for about a quarter of both total fixed investment and bank lending over the past 5 years before the pandemic. On the demand side, the property sector’s importance reflects massive household savings—linked, in part, to the inadequate social protection system (see Box 2)—and limited alternative investment options. After allowing private housing investment to function as a key countercyclical policy tool in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, including through a significant run-up in leverage, the authorities have repeatedly sought to rein in the property sector owing to financial stability concerns. They redoubled these efforts after the initial recovery from last year’s national pandemic lockdown, including by imposing tougher restrictions on new funding for developers.

New controls on developer credit bring to the fore concerns over the potential for intra-sector contagion. Like Evergrande, many property developers are also highly leveraged, with weak earnings and liquidity. Many developers are also exposed to inadequately disclosed risks, like sizeable but opaque off balance sheet risks from guarantees and joint ventures. The sector’s growing dependence on pre-sales of unfinished housing as a source of funding—now over one-third, up from 25 percent in 2014—increases its vulnerability to sector-wide confidence shocks and runs.3 Some of this revenue is not properly escrowed, a risky practice which increases leverage and makes households creditors, despite their limited ability to monitor the risks of these loans. The failure to complete unfinished housing inventory by defaulting developers not only undermines consumer confidence, but also risks lowering households’ willingness to buy homes via pre-sales with other developers, propagating liquidity strains within the sector. These vulnerabilities are compounded by survey-based evidence that points to high price-to-income ratios in various cities.

These vulnerabilities could potentially lead to a broader credit crunch among developers, raising risks
of a downside scenario engulfing the wider real estate sector:

• Developer funding pressures could spill over to property prices if housing demand slumps or distressed developers are forced to sell inventories at a discount, reinforcing contagion within the sector.

• Falling prices and increasing construction delays could halt pre-sales and trigger a sharp retrenchment of housing demand by households generally, further amplifying financial stress for property developers.

• At this point, the financial system might be affected, causing credit supply to contract for developers and households alike. While banks’ loan exposure to Evergrande is not systemic, lending to real estate firms represents 7 percent of total lending, residential mortgages are another 21 percent, and a large share of other bank loans are collateralized by property. In addition, banks are highly exposed to non-bank financial institutions, which in turn hold large exposures to developers and other land-exposed firms. Trusts, a type of NBFI, have financed between 16-22 percent of the rapidly growing real estate investment in China over the last four years.

A sharper-than-expected slowdown in the property sector could trigger a wide range of adverse effects on aggregate demand, with feedback loops to the financial sector. Domestically, this could include a sharp retrenchment of real estate investment, which in 2020 accounted for an estimated 8.7 percent of GDP. This would have knock-on effects on other private investment as the real estate sector accounts for 11 percent of total purchases of intermediate materials. Moreover, local governments may be forced into unwanted fiscal consolidation as revenues from land sales fall. And a sustained fall in house prices would likely weigh on private consumption, through weaker income and employment (construction represents 13 percent of total employment) and wealth effects (80 percent of households own their homes).

A sudden slowdown in China’s growth would create spillovers through trade and commodity prices. Model-based simulations of a decline in investment in China due to financial stress suggest that a one percent decline in China’s output lowers growth in the rest of the world by about one-tenth of a percent (Dizioli and others, 2016). While real estate investment is less trade-intensive than other investment, direct and indirect trade exposures from the rest of the world are still sizeable. Foreign value added in China’s construction sector (including both real estate and infrastructure) accounts for 0.5 percent of global (excl. China) GDP, with larger exposures for some Asian and commodity exporting economies. China’s final demand in the construction sector absorbs a sizeable fraction of global value added in basic metals (14 percent), mining (6 percent) and oil and chemicals (5 percent) sectors

Financial spillovers would mostly operate via a deterioration in global risk appetite. While direct nonresidents’ holdings of Chinese financial assets have grown in recent years as a result of the inclusion of China in global benchmark indexes, with property developers being active issuers in offshore bond markets (US$200 billion of outstanding bonds), direct exposures to China remain relatively small. However, given strong trade related spillovers, global risk appetite would likely be affected, which could lead to tighter financial conditions, especially in emerging markets (GFSR, Apr, 2016). The policy response to property developer stress necessarily involves difficult trade-offs. In the short term, authorities have the policy space and tools to limit disorderly spillovers within the financial sector and lessen any adverse impact on the economy. The timing and extent of support, however, must balance the need to avert destabilizing confidence shocks with the imperative to minimize backtracking in efforts to curb moral hazard and contain leverage. Key elements of a policy response should include:

• Guarding against systemic contagion: For now, the priority should be to contain large-scale spillovers to housing demand and economic activity while still allowing market forces to reduce vulnerabilities. This requires intensifying risk monitoring efforts, strengthening the central government’s coordinating role in policy responses, and facilitating the restructuring of troubled developers while ensuring the timely completion of pre-sold housing inventories.

• Dealing with escalating risk: if large-scale spillovers to housing markets threaten economic and financial stability, bolder steps will be needed including government backstops for liquidity provision to stressed developers and guarantee mechanisms for completion of presold housing. These measures should be temporary and subject to strict safeguards to minimize moral hazard (see below). Decisive macroeconomic easing would protect against shortfalls in aggregate demand.

• Addressing structural shortcomings. As soon as risks recede, ensuring property sector risks decline to safer levels will require curbing risks from pre-sales practices, introducing property taxes, and other measures to ease investment-related housing demand and reduce local government incentives to boost property markets.”