The Unassuming Economist

From a VOX post by Sebastian Edwards:

“In a few decades, Chile experienced dramatic economic growth and the fastest reduction of inequality in the region. Yet, many Chilean citizens feel that inequality has greatly increased. Such feelings of ‘malestar’ triggered the violent social unrest of October 2019. This paper explains this seeming paradox by differentiating ‘vertical’ (income) inequality from ‘horizontal’ (social) inequality. It argues that the neoliberalism that created Chile’s economic growth is no longer effective and that Chile may be headed towards adopting a welfare state model.

The October 2019 social explosion in Chile took everyone by surprise. The scale of protests and the violence of demonstrators had no precedent. Millions of people marched demanding change. Protesters embraced all sort of causes but one demand united them: they were against inequality and privilege. The police responded with force and were accused of multiple human rights violations.

For a long time, economists praised Chile’s market-oriented reforms. Moreover, Chile’s political system and institutions were ranked highly by think tanks such as Freedom House (2019). However, many analysts pointed out that inequality was Chile’s Achilles heel (Edwards 2010). Its Gini coefficient is one of the highest in the OECD although it has declined rapidly; during the last two decades, there has been significant progress in social conditions.

Chile went from being the poorest country in a sample of Latin American countries (jointly with Peru) to having the highest GDP per capita in the region (Figure 1). In 2016, Chile’s Gini was equal to the median in the region (Figure 2). Chile is among the countries that reduced inequality the fastest since 2000: the Gini declined from 56 to 46 between 2000 and 2016 (Figure 3). Other indicators of social progress, such as the Human Development Index,¹ rank Chile in the first place in Latin America.’

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From a VOX post by Davide Furceri, Prakash Loungani, and Jonathan D. Ostry:

“Free trade has contributed to a ‘great convergence’ of emerging market countries toward incomes in industrialised nations in recent decades. It is less clear whether free mobility of capital across national boundaries has conferred similar benefits. This column presents evidence suggesting that the gains in average incomes have been – at best – small, while increases in income inequality and the decline in the labour share of income have been significant. Financial globalisation thus poses far more difficult equity-efficiency trade-offs than free trade and should be at the centre of debates about how to make globalisation inclusive.

Even some staunch defenders of international trade have long been sceptical of the benefits of financial globalisation (e.g. Bhagwati 1998). Rodrik (1998) famously wrote that letting capital flow freely across the world would leave economies “hostage to the whims and fancies of two dozen or so thirty-somethings in London, Frankfurt and New York”. Arteta et al. (2001) concluded that any evidence of a positive impact of capital account liberalisation on growth is “decidedly fragile”, a finding that has largely held up in the literature that has followed.

Our recent work takes a fresh look at the effects of policies to liberalise international capital flows for a group of nearly 150 countries over the period 1970-2015 (Furceri et al. 2019). There are two novel aspects of our work.

• First, we look at the impact on both average (or aggregate) income as well as the distribution of income. While the potential for international trade to generate ‘winners and losers’ has long been recognised – and has been the source of much recent debate – financial globalisation has tended to go scot free of similar scrutiny.

• Second, we use industry-level data to identify some of the causal mechanisms through which financial globalisation has aggregate and distributional impacts.”

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From a paper by BMC Public Health:

“Background: Previous research shows that parental unemployment is associated with low life satisfaction in adolescents. It is unclear whether this translates to an association between national unemployment and adolescent life satisfaction, and whether such a contextual association is entirely explained by parental unemployment, or if it changes as a function thereof. For adults, associations have been shown between unemployment and mental health, including that national unemployment can affect mental health and life satisfaction of both the employed and the unemployed, but to different degrees. The aim of this paper is to analyse how national unemployment levels are related to adolescent life satisfaction, across countries as well as over time within a country, and to what extent and in what ways such an association depends on whether the individual’s own parents are unemployed or not.

Methods: Repeated cross-sectional data on adolescents’ (aged 11, 13 and 15 years, n = 386,402) life satisfaction and parental unemployment were collected in the Health Behaviour in School-aged Children (HBSC) survey, in 27 countries and 74 country-years, across 2001/02, 2005/06 and 2009/10 survey cycles. We linked this data to national harmonised unemployment rates provided by OECD and tested their associations using multilevel linear regression, including interaction terms between national and parental unemployment.

Results: Higher national unemployment rates were related to lower adolescent life satisfaction, cross-sectionally between countries but not over time within countries. The verified association was significant for adolescents with and without unemployed parents, but stronger so in adolescents with unemployed fathers or both parents unemployed. Having an unemployed father, mother och both parents was in itself related to lower life satisfaction.

Conclusion: Living in a country with higher national unemployment seems to be related to lower adolescent life satisfaction, whether parents are unemployed or not, although stronger among adolescents where the father or both parents are unemployed. However, variation in unemployment over the years did not show an association with adolescent life satisfaction.”

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On the US:

• A profile of profiles Harvard’s Edward Glaeser – IMF
• Affordable housing in Los Angeles: Delivering more—and doing it faster – McKinsey & Company
• 2019 Millennial Homeownership Report: More Millennials Are Preparing For A Life of Renting – Apartment List
• Studies: Single-family rentals can limit access to housing – Cornell University
• AEI Housing Market Indicators release on August 2019 data – American Enterprise Institute
• Public Housing Becomes the Latest Progressive Fantasy – The Atlantic
• This is exactly how much housing speculation can affect household income and employment – MarketWatch
• House Prices, Investors, and Credit in the Great Housing Bust – New York University
• Rapid Re-Housing in High Cost Markets – Urban Institute

On other countries:

• [Germany] A fall in house prices would not devastate Germany’s economy – Financial Times
• [Germany] Germany’s house price growth accelerates – Global Property Guide
• [Portugal] Portugal’s housing market is strengthening – Global Property Guide
• [Slovak Republic] Slovak Republic’s house price rises continue – Global Property Guide
• [United Kingdom] Fewer property cash buyers as downsizers stay put – Financial Times

From the European Central Bank:

“This article provides evidence that economies receiving more funding from stock markets than credit markets generate less carbon. Increasing the equity financing share to one-half globally would reduce aggregate per capita carbon emissions by about one-quarter of the Paris Agreement commitment. Our findings call for supporting equity-based initiatives rather than policies aimed at decarbonising the European economy through the banking sector.

Financial markets and global warming

The 2015 Paris Climate Conference firmly put at the heart of the debate on environmental degradation a sector of the economy that may surprise some readers: finance. Accordingly, the leaders of the G20 stated their intention to fund low-carbon infrastructure and other climate solutions by scaling up so-called green finance initiatives. Key examples are the burgeoning market for green bonds, whose issuance reached USD 48 billion in the first quarter of 2019^[2], and the creation of a green credit department by the largest financial institution in the world, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China.

Somewhat paradoxically, the interest in green finance has also laid bare our limited understanding of the relationship between traditional finance and the environment. Yet it is important for us to understand that relationship, because most of the global transition to a low-carbon economy will need to be funded by the private financial sector if international climate goals are to be met on time (UNEP, 2011). Are expanding financial markets detrimental to the environment? Do they cause harm, for instance, by fuelling economic growth and the concomitant emission of pollutants? Or, do they steer economies towards sustainable growth by favouring green sectors over so-called brown ones? And is there a difference in this regard between credit markets and equity markets? Do they have the same impact on environmental degradation, or does it make economic sense to stimulate one segment of the financial system at the expense of the other?

We explore those questions in this article, which is based on a recent ECB working paper (De Haas and Popov, 2019). Here, as in the working paper, we present novel evidence that, when it comes to addressing climate change, not all financial markets are created equal. As it turns out, stock markets are superior to banks in decarbonising the economy. As we show, for a given level of economic development, financial development, and environmental protection, economies generate fewer carbon emissions per capita if they receive relatively more of their funding from stock markets than from credit markets.”

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