The Unassuming Economist

From a new paper by Ning Jia, Raven Molloy, Christopher Smith, and Abigail Wozniak:

“Internal migration patterns in the US have drawn growing attention among researchers, policy analysts, and others. This interest has been driven by two trends. First, internal migration in the US has fallen for more than three decades (Molloy et al. 2011; Frey 2009; Cooke 2011, 2013). This decline raises questions about whether it stems from desirable factors, like improved location or job matching, or undesirable factors, like employer monopsony power or other barriers to job mobility (Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl 2017; Molloy et al. 2016). Relatedly, highly educated Americans have become increasingly concentrated in larger cities (Diamond 2016). Thus, both the level of migration in the US and the types of destinations chosen by different types of people have changed in important ways over the last several decades.

(…)

Dao et al. (2017) revisit the key ideas from BK and show more directly that the nature of local labor market adjustment to demand shocks has changed in the last few decades—and that the diminished responsiveness of net migration is a key reason for the change in how local labor markets adjust. The authors take a similar approach to BK by estimating adjustment margins at the state level’s response to demand shocks. However, they extend the BK sample with an additional 20 years of data and make other methodological innovations, including using administrative data on migration flows instead of inferring population adjustment from CPS-based measures. Among the many useful contributions of this analysis is a demonstration that after 1990, the net migration response to a state-level demand shock has been smaller on average than in earlier periods, and the response of the unemployment and labor force participation rates is larger. Hence, one way to reconcile the BK findings with the more recent conflicting evidence on local labor market adjustment and regional divergence is that migration was more important as an equilibrating mechanism from the 1970s through the early 1990s (the period in the BK sample) and has recently become less important.”

From a VoxEU post by Yoto Yotov:

“This year marks the 60th anniversary of the workhorse model of trade – the gravity equation. This column celebrates the anniversary by addressing some misconceptions about gravity and by tracing its evolution from an intuitive a-theoretical application to an estimating computable general equilibrium model that can be nested in more complex frameworks.

This year marks the 60th anniversary of the workhorse model of trade – the gravity equation (Tinbergen1962). Gravity is a ‘celebrity’ among economic models; it has been applied and extended in thousands of papers by trade economists, colleagues from other fields, and policy practitioners. Moreover, as noted by the brilliant late Peter Neary, the gravity equation is probably the only econometric model that has been featured on the front page of the Financial Times (on 19 April 2016). 

Unfortunately, and as sometimes happens to celebrities, the gravity model is misspecified (misunderstood) by the press. More worrisome, we often see gravity applications in academic papers and policy reports that are not consistent with theory and/or do not take into account major developments in the empirical gravity literature. As a result, the estimates in such papers could be severely biased and their policy recommendations could be misleading. Moreover, while it is well understood that trade theory and trade-policy analysis should be set in general equilibrium (GE), there is still a division and scepticism among academics and trade-policy practitioners about the usefulness of the gravity as a Computable GE (CGE) framework for counterfactual projections. A prominent example, which motivated the inclusion of the gravity equation in the Financial Times, is the debate among UK economists over gravity-based projections of the Brexit effects.

To celebrate gravity’s anniversary and address some misconceptions about the gravity model, in a new paper (Yotov 2022) I trace its evolution, as depicted in Figure 1, from a naive application to an ‘estimating CGE’ (E-CGE) model that can be nested in more complex frameworks.”

Continue reading here.

From a NBER paper by Efraim Benmelech and Michal Zator:

“Automation technologies, and robots in particular, are thought to be massively displacing workers and transforming the future of work. We study firm investment in automation using cross-country data on robotization as well as administrative data from Germany with information on firm-level automation decisions. Our findings suggest that the impact of robots on firms has been limited. First, investment in robots is small and highly concentrated in a few industries, accounting for less than 0.30% of aggregate expenditures on equipment. Second, recent increases in robotization do not resemble the explosive growth observed for IT technologies in the past, and are driven mostly by catching-up of developing countries. Third, robot adoption by firms endogenously responds to labor scarcity, alleviating potential displacement of existing workers. Fourth, firms that invest in robots increase employment, while total employment effect in exposed industries and regions is negative, but modest in magnitude. We contrast robots with other digital technologies that are more widespread. Their importance in firms’ investment is significantly higher, and their link with labor markets, while sharing some similarities with robots, appears markedly different.”

From Econbrowser:

“The Bureau of Economic Analysis announced today that seasonally adjusted U.S. real GDP grew at a 6.9% annual rate in the fourth quarter, more than twice the average growth rate the U.S. has seen since World War II.

The new data put the Econbrowser recession indicator index at 1.2%, historically a very low value and signalling an unambiguous continuation of the economic expansion. The number posted today (1.2%) is an assessment of the situation of the economy in the previous quarter (namely 2021:Q3). We use the one-quarter lag to allow for data revisions and to gain better precision. This index provides the basis for an automatic procedure that we have been implementing for 15 years for assigning dates for the first and last quarters of economic recessions. As we announced a year ago, the COVID recession ended in the second quarter of 2020. The NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee subsequently made the same announcement in July.

Continue reading here.

From a VoxEU post by Nathan Nunn, Stelios Michalopoulos, Elias Papaioannou, and Léonard Wantchékon:

“Since the 2000s, a vibrant stream of research on African political economy and economic history has emerged that has produced a plethora of insights and has uncovered the shadow that Africa’s past casts on contemporary economic, social, and political development. This column introduces a free online course on “African History through the Lens of Economics”, which will bring together the considerable volume of work in the economics literature of the past decades. The course is open to students with a background and interest in economics, political science, history, cultural anthropology, and psychology.

Views about Africa are, were, and most likely will continue to be highly polarising. Some economists, finance professionals, multinational executives, global entrepreneurs, and businesspeople are bullish, as there are investment opportunities in infrastructure, manufacturing, and technology, coupled with a young population that is increasingly more educated and confident. However, many are less optimistic, concerned about misgovernance, conflict, weak state capacity, corruption and poor infrastructure. Pessimists point to Africa’s dark past, including the atrocities and exploitation during colonisation, and the slave trades. 

In 2000, The Economist called Africa “the hopeless continent”. A decade later, after strong growth and institutional advancement, it renamed it “the hopeful continent”. A few years later, in 2016, the magazine described it in more nuanced terms as a land of “1.2 billion opportunities” – a reference to the potential market that its huge population constituted. Economics research has followed a similar train. In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, only a handful of papers were published outside specialised outlets. But, since the 2000s, a vibrant stream of research on African political economy and economic history has emerged. The new economic history approach departs greatly from prevailing thinking in important ways.

First, scholars realised that ill-conceived, post-independence urban-rural agriculture and trade policies, authoritarianism, conflict, corruption, and lack of structural transformation (the foci of pre-2000 studies) often had deep roots stemming from colonial extraction, enslavement, the artificial design of country borders, underinvestment, and cash-crop specialisation during colonisation. 

Second, the new economics research became more interdisciplinary. For example, applied research started scrutinising influential ideas proposed by historians, political scientists, sociologists, and even cultural anthropologists. 

Third, the studies began moving beyond purely economic outcomes and drivers of development. They examined, for example, the origins and the implications of the vast differences in social capital, civicism, cultural preferences, and values. This more evolutionary approach to economic history has led to a fruitful dialogue between economics and the other social sciences; albeit one not without tension.”