The Unassuming Economist

A Brookings piece based on a new paper by Carol Graham and Sergio Pinto:

“There is much to be troubled about in the state of America today. We boast booming stock markets and record low levels of unemployment, yet significant sectors of our society are dying prematurely from preventable deaths (deaths of despair) and almost 20% of prime aged males are out of the labor force.1 Americans have higher levels of well-being inequality and report more pain on average than countries of comparable and even lower levels of income. There are other signs of decline, ranging from falling levels of civic trust to viscerally divided politics.

These trends have already received significant scholarly attention. Yet we provide a different perspective by tracking the reported well-being and ill-being of individuals and places. We find large differences in these trends across education levels, races, and places. Desperation – and the associated trends in premature mortality – are concentrated among the less than college educated and are much higher among poor whites than poor minorities, who remain optimistic about their futures. The trends are also geographically dispersed, with racially and economically diverse urban and coastal places much more optimistic and with much lower incidences of premature mortality (on average). Both death and desperation are higher in the heartland and in particular in areas that were previously hubs for the manufacturing and mining jobs which have long since disappeared.

Our earlier work shows that the geographic patterns in lack of hope, worry, reported pain, reliance on disability insurance, and deaths of despair are remarkably consistent across these places. Monnat and Brown (2017) find that counties with higher levels of poverty, obesity, deaths due to drugs, alcohol, and suicide, more non-Hispanic whites, individuals on disability or other safety nets, and smokers were the same places where Trump “over-performed” in terms of predicted votes 2016.3

In this paper, we supplement what we know about these race and place-based trends with new research on the role of inter-generational mobility, prime aged individuals out in the labor force, and rural and micropolitan versus urban differences. We explore how patterns across these cohorts, races, and places associate with the worrisome trends in lack of hope and premature death. We also add in new indicators which assess financial, social, purpose, and community level well-being”

From VOX post by Caroline Freund, Alen Mulabdic, and Michele Ruta:

“The conventional wisdom is that 3D printing will shorten supply chains and reduce world trade. This column examines the trade effects of the shift to 3D printing in the production of hearing aids. It shows that adopting the new technology in production increased trade by roughly 60% as production costs came down. An analysis of 35 other products that are increasingly produced using 3D printing also finds positive effects but suggests that product characteristics such as bulkiness can affect the relationship between 3D printing and trade.

Will 3D printing disrupt world trade? The new technology has been accompanied by predictions of a future where goods will be printed locally, global supply chains will be shortened, and international trade will be dramatically reduced. Firms (and perhaps even consumers) will be able to create a solid three-dimensional object from a digital file and will no longer need to import printable goods and components. One study calculates that as much as 40% of trade could be eliminated by 2040 (Leering 2017). Other studies acknowledge that the impact of 3D printing on trade may be complex but still find that 3D printing and automation could lower world trade by 10% by 2030 (Lund and Bughin 2019).

In contrast, many earlier improvements in production processes that have reduced real costs have boosted international trade. The industrial revolution is perhaps the best example, where a transformation in technology and management practices brought huge productivity gains, output growth, and expanding trade. The digital revolution of the 1990s had a similar boosting effect on world trade through the rise of global supply chains (Baldwin 2016). The impact of 3D-printing technology on world trade is, therefore, an empirical question.

We address this question in a new paper (Freund et al. 2019), focusing on hearing aids, a product that since the mid-2000s has almost exclusively been produced with 3D printing. We then extend the analysis to 35 other products that are increasingly using 3D printing. The evidence suggests that firms (and countries) will continue to specialise and 3D printing will stimulate rather than hamper trade growth.

The 3D printing revolution in hearing aids

The good where 3D printing is most prevalent is hearing aids. Nearly 100% of all hearing aids consumed in the world are produced using 3D printing.  3D printers transformed the hearing aid industry in less than 500 days in the mid-2000s, which makes it a unique natural experiment to assess the trade effects of this technology (Figure 1).”

 

Figure 1 Adoption of 3D printing for custom hearing aids at Phonak

Source: Brans (2013)

Continue reading here.

 

From VOX post by Jennifer Hunt and Ryan Nunn:

“Over the last five decades, middle-wage jobs diminished in the US as wage inequality increased. This column investigates the relationship between these two phenomena, and finds no evidence that either computerisation or automation (often cited as a source of both trends) produced employment polarisation or increased wage inequality. By examining wages at the individual level (rather than occupation-average wages), the column suggests that the evolution of wages can be better explained by distinct causes—ranging from changing labour market institutions to globalisation—than by observable demographic factors.

Middle-wage jobs in the US are gradually diminishing while wage inequality has been rising. But are the two related? Does the decline in middle-wage jobs represent polarisation of employment, and is the decline a good or a bad thing for workers?

Inequality between top and middle hourly wages has increased steadily for the last 50 years in the US. By contrast, inequality between middle and bottom wages rose sharply in the 1980s; then, after a slight decline, it remained stable for the next 30 years. These gaps are commonly measured as the ratio of the 90th and 50th percentile wages (the wage of the worker earning more than 90% of workers relative to the wage of the worker earning more than 50% of workers) and the ratio of the 50th and 10th percentile wages, as shown in Figure 1.

Note: Difference between 90th and median log hourly wages (90-50) and median and 10th percentile wages (50-10), weighted by weekly hours work. Non-self employed workers 18-64 without missing values for covariates used elsewhere in the paper, but including imputed values.
Source: CPS MORGs 1979-2018 and CPS Mays 1973-1979.

Economists have investigated many potential explanations for these changes, including the decline of unions (Fortin et al. 2019); the inflation-adjusted minimum wage (Lee 1999); the spread of outsourcing and temporary-agency labour (Feenstra and Hanson 1999); reduced competition and dynamism (Furman and Orszag 2018, Shambaugh et al. 2018); and increased international trade, off-shoring, and technological progress (Blum 2008, Feenstra and Hanson 2003). The first two factors played an important role in the 1980s, and many researchers believe that technology has played an important role throughout.

A complementary analysis focuses on employment shares of low-, middle-, and high-wage workers rather than wage inequality. One of the most striking findings from this work is that the share of middle-wage jobs has declined. This decline can be measured in different ways, one of which is to examine shifts in the occupational composition of employment. Some research foregrounds the role of technology in its examination of these shifts, because in addition to a decline in the employment share of middle-wage occupations and a rise in employment share of high-wage occupations, the share of low-wage occupation employment share has been rising (e.g. Autor 2015a,b and Autor and Dorn 2013 for the US; Goos et al. 2009 and Goos et al. 2014 for other countries).”

Continue reading here.

From the IMF’s latest WEO analytical chapter:

“The pace of structural reforms in emerging market and developing economies was strong during the 1990s, but it has slowed since the early 2000s. Using a newly constructed database on structural reforms, this chapter finds that a reform push in such areas as governance, domestic and external finance, trade, and labor and product markets could deliver sizable output gains in the medium term. A major and comprehensive reform package might double the speed of convergence of the average emerging market and developing economy to the living standards of advanced economies, raising annual GDP growth by about 1 percentage point for some time. At the same time, reforms take several years to deliver, and some of them—easing job protection regulation and liberalizing domestic finance—may entail greater short-term costs when carried out in bad times; these are best implemented under favorable economic conditions and early in authorities’ electoral mandate. Reform gains also tend to be larger when governance and access to credit—two binding constraints on growth—are strong, and where labor market informality is higher—because reforms help reduce it. These findings underscore the importance of carefully tailoring reforms to country circumstances to maximize their benefits.”

From a VOX post by Stefania Albanesi:

“The US economy has been hampered over the last four decades by three trends: the productivity slowdown, the Great Moderation, and jobless recoveries. Economists seeking to explain these phenomena have generally looked to the impact that technological change has on labour demand. This column proposes an alternative explanation: the rise and stabilisation of women’s participation in the workforce, one of the most notable developments in the post-war US. Excluding gender differences in aggregate models of the US economy obscures our understanding of business cycle behaviour and economic performance.

The rise in women’s market work is one of the most notable economic developments in the post-war United States. Female participation rose from 37% in 1960 to a peak of 61% in 1997, and then flattened out, as shown in Figure 1. This phenomenon contributed substantially to the rise in aggregate hours per person in the US in the 1970s and 1980s. While a large literature has studied the determinants of the rise in women’s employment, the implications of this phenomenon for the aggregate performance of the US economy have been left largely unexplored. At the same time, several key properties of US business cycles changed over this period, and economists have yet to provide a comprehensive explanation of those changes. Three particularly puzzling phenomena stand out:

• the productivity slowdown in the 1970s (Jorgenson 1988) and the decline in the cyclical correlation between aggregate per capita hours and productivity (Gali and Gambetti 2009);
• the decline in the cyclicality of output and aggregate hours starting in the early 1980s, known as the Great Moderation (Stock and Watson 2002); and
• the sluggish growth in employment in the aftermath of recessions starting in the early 1990s, often referred to as jobless recoveries (Graetz and Michaels 2017).”

Continue reading here.