Showing posts with label Global Housing Watch. Show all posts
Friday, July 13, 2018
From the IMF’s latest report on Vietnam:
“Real estate prices have rebounded from the lows seen in the GFC but remain well below the
highs of 2008. Price-to-rent ratios suggest that the increase in property prices is in line with growing demand for housing from a rapidly growing urban middle class with rising incomes (…). The availability of affordable housing is also increasing, supported in part by low-interest mortgage lending by SOCBs.”
From the IMF’s latest report on Vietnam:
“Real estate prices have rebounded from the lows seen in the GFC but remain well below the
highs of 2008. Price-to-rent ratios suggest that the increase in property prices is in line with growing demand for housing from a rapidly growing urban middle class with rising incomes (…). The availability of affordable housing is also increasing, supported in part by low-interest mortgage lending by SOCBs.”
Posted by at 8:27 AM
Labels: Global Housing Watch
From a new paper by Bank of Israel and Hebrew University:
“In this paper I overview the development of macroprudential policy (MPP) and, in particular, its regulatory structure, its influence on the financial system, and its costs and benefits. I find that the effectiveness of MPP depends on the institutional setup in which it is implemented it: often, MPP is under the responsibility of the central banks, but this setup may generate conflicts between MPP and traditional monetary policy. I also discuss another issue undermining the effectiveness of MPP, namely, “leakages,” migrations of financial activity outside the scope of application and enforcement of the MPP tool. Based on the Israeli experience of implementing MPP, I argue that coordination between the regulatory authorities supervising different segments of the financial system is crucial for the successful implementation of MPP.”
From a new paper by Bank of Israel and Hebrew University:
“In this paper I overview the development of macroprudential policy (MPP) and, in particular, its regulatory structure, its influence on the financial system, and its costs and benefits. I find that the effectiveness of MPP depends on the institutional setup in which it is implemented it: often, MPP is under the responsibility of the central banks, but this setup may generate conflicts between MPP and traditional monetary policy.
Posted by at 8:18 AM
Labels: Global Housing Watch
On cross-country:
On the US:
On other countries:
Photo by Aliis Sinisalu
On cross-country:
On the US:
Posted by at 8:05 AM
Labels: Global Housing Watch
Friday, July 6, 2018
From a new IMF working paper:
“The risk shifting incentive identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976) can induce excessive
risk taking by banks in a competitive environment (Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000)).
This paper tests this risk shifting hypothesis of competition in the U.S. mortgage market
between 2000 and 2005. Our study exploits a natural exogenous variation of local house
price volatility in the cross section of U.S. cities and counties, one of the most important
sources of risk for mortgage returns. This paper finds that banks in high-competition markets
lowered their lending standards (e.g., raising the loan-to-income ratio and acceptance rate) in anticipation of high house price volatility while those in low-competition markets did not, an indication consistent with the risk shifting hypothesis.This paper also examines the real economic consequences of this risk taking pattern through
the credit supply channel. In particular, it studies the change in local employment in
non-financail sectors at the beginning of the Great Recession. We find that between 2007 and
2009 non-financial sector employment in high competition markets lost 1.5 percent for one
standard deviation increase in local house price volatility, while this relationship was
insignificant for low-competition markets. This exercise identifies a credit-supply channel, in
addition to the demand channel shown in Mian and Sufi (2014), that contributed to the rise in non-financial sector unemployment during the Great Recession.The analysis in this study shows the importance of banks’ risk taking incentive due to
competition prior to the recent crisis. It helps deepen the understanding of why the financial
sector had accumulated so much mortgage risk despite that an reverting house price would
lead to massive mortgage defaults (e.g., Palmer (2015)). When studying the impact on the
real economy such as non-financial sector employment, this risk taking pattern can also be
used to identify the credit supply channel of bank lending. This analysis offers a possible
strategy to disentangle the supply and demand effects of bank lending on real economic
activities.”
From a new IMF working paper:
“The risk shifting incentive identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976) can induce excessive
risk taking by banks in a competitive environment (Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000)).
This paper tests this risk shifting hypothesis of competition in the U.S. mortgage market
between 2000 and 2005. Our study exploits a natural exogenous variation of local house
price volatility in the cross section of U.S.
Posted by at 5:04 PM
Labels: Global Housing Watch
On cross-country:
On the US:
On other countries:
Photo by Aliis Sinisalu
On cross-country:
On the US:
Posted by at 4:56 PM
Labels: Global Housing Watch
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