The Unassuming Economist

From Marginal Revolution:

“As a metric of how well economes are doing, gdp is underrated, as I argue in my latest Bloomberg column.  Here is one bit:

If a nation has a lot of foreign direct investment, as does Ireland, GDP will exceed GNP by a considerable amount. According to the Irish government, the country’s GDP is about 370 billion euros. Its GNP is less than 300 billion euros. The difference in GDP and GNP is largely accounted for by the outflow of profits to foreign-owned multinationals.

This isn’t just a story about Ireland. Many other nations have had significant differences between their GDP and GNP, including many developing nations and, at times, Singapore.

The conventional wisdom is that GNP is the proper measure of living standards, because domestic citizens do not have claims on the profits of foreign multinationals. That isn’t wrong, but it is also an incomplete answer. When it comes to the future prospects of a country, GDP is a better indicator. Countries that have a high ratio of GDP to GNP are especially promising, though there are some caveats.

A relatively high GDP is a sign that a large number of foreign companies view the future of the domestic economy as bright. They are “putting their money where their mouth is.”

In the case of Ireland, the country is now the only member of the European Union in which English is the main language not only for business but also for schools and public life. Foreign investors are drawn by that fact. They also see that Ireland is relatively underpopulated, and appears to be receptive to absorbing talented foreign immigrants. Furthermore, Ireland is ruled by mainstream parties and seems largely unaffected by the populism and nativism that are creating problems elsewhere in Europe.

All these realities are reason to be bullish. It is also reasonable to expect that the Irish government will be relatively friendly to business looking forward.”

From Noahpinion:

“It’s always an interesting experience to read books about China’s economy from before 2018 or so. So many world-shaking events have changed the story since then — Trump’s trade war, Covid, Xi’s industrial crackdowns, the real estate bust, lockdowns, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Reading predictions of China’s evolution from before these events occurred is a little like reading sci-fi from 1962.

When I started China’s Economy: What Everyone Needs to Know®, by the veteran economic consultant Arthur Kroeber, I was prepared for this surreal effect. After all, it was published in April 2016 — not the most opportune timing. So I was pleasantly surprised by how relevant the book still felt. Most of the book’s explanations of aspects of the Chinese economy — fiscal federalism, urbanization and real estate construction, corruption, Chinese firms’ position within the supply chain, etc. — are either still highly relevant, or provide important explanations of what Xi’s policies were reacting against. Dan Wang was not wrong to recommend that I read it.

But China’s Economy is still a book from 2016, and through it all runs a strain of stubborn optimism that seems a lot less justifiable six years later. Most crucially, while Kroeber acknowledged many of China’s economic challenges — an unsustainable pace of real estate construction, low efficiency of capital, an imbalance between investment and consumption, and so on — he argued that China would eventually overcome these challenges by shifting from an extensive growth model based on resource mobilization to one based on greater efficiency and productivity improvements. This was despite his acknowledgement of the fact that productivity growth had already slowed well before 2016, and that Xi’s policies so far didn’t seem up to the challenge of reviving it.

In many ways, productivity growth is the thread that ties together the entire story of the Chinese economy since 2008. Basic economic theory says that eventually the growth benefits of capital accumulation hit a wall, and you have to improve technology and/or efficiency to keep growth going. Some countries, like Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, have done this successfully, and are now rich; other, like Thailand, failed to do it and are now languishing at the middle income level. For several decades, Chinese productivity growth looked like Japan’s or Korea’s did. But slightly before Xi came to power, it downshifted to look a bit more like Thailand. Here’s a graph from the Lowy Institute’s recent report:”

From a new paper by Adolfo Maza:

“Okun’s law is one of the best-known stylized facts in the economic literature, as well as one of the most widely used policy tools. The aim of this paper, which utilizes a comprehensive sample of 265 European regions by using annual observations covering the period from 2000 to 2019, is to deepen our knowledge of Okun’s law from two perspectives: on one hand, by checking the existence and intensity of regional differences, and on the other hand, by assessing the factors that explain them. To this end, in the first part, we apply a heterogeneous panel approach that deals with cross-sectional dependence, which allows us to obtain an average coefficient as well as region-specific coefficients. In the second part, a cross-sectional spatial model is used to uncover explanatory factors. Our findings reveal quite remarkable regional differences, as well as a somewhat geographical pattern in them. Moreover, they point out the importance of demographic factors (such as gender and age), labor market variables (share of employment in industry and construction, as well as self-employment and part-time employment and the severity of long-term unemployment), R&D expenditure, and some national institutional factors when it comes to explaining differences across regions.”

From VoxEU post by Pierre Bachas, Matthew Fisher-Post, Anders Jensen, and Gabriel Zucman:

“Globalisation has wide-ranging effects on tax systems. This column uses a new dataset of taxes on capital and labour across countries and time to assess these dynamics. The authors document a global convergence of average effective labour and capital taxes over time, as labour taxes have increased and capital taxes fallen. However, the large fall in capital taxation in developed economies contrasts its gradual rise in developing economies, albeit from a low base. This trend is consistent with evidence suggesting the causal effect of trade integration on the tax capacity of developing economies.

Social scientists have for a long time been cognisant that globalisation may have deep impacts on tax systems. In particular, economists have conjectured that increased openness pushes governments to reduce taxes on mobile factors of production and recover the revenue shortfalls by increasing taxes on immobile factors (Bates et al. 1985, Rodrik 1997). In this view, globalisation erodes the taxes effectively paid by capital owners, shifting the tax burden towards workers. The fall of statutory tax rates on corporate income worldwide (IMF 2019), and evidence that globalisation reduces income tax rates on mobile high-income earners at the expense of median-income workers (Egger et al. 2019) support this hypothesis. Prior work has focused on the recent experience of high-income countries, but how has cross-border integration affected the relative taxation of labour and capital historically and globally? And which countries have been most affected by the erosion of effective capital taxation, and why? Answering these questions is critical to shed light on the macroeconomic effects and long-run social sustainability of globalisation. 

A new dataset to measure the effective taxation of capital and labour globally since the 1960s 

Assessing the extent to which globalisation has affected tax systems requires a global and long-run dataset on the taxation of capital and labour. In Bachas et al. (2022), we assemble data on effective tax rates (ETRs) on labour and capital covering 150 countries and half a century. Constructed following a common methodology, these series offer a worldwide, historical, and comparative perspective on the evolution of tax structures.¹  

ETRs capture all taxes paid: on corporate income, individual income, payroll, property, inheritance, and consumption. They then assign each type of tax revenue to capital, labour or a mix of the two and divide these by their respective capital and labour flows in national accounts (Mendoza et al. 1994).²  ETRs thus make it possible to estimate total tax wedges – for instance, the gap between what it costs to employ a worker and what the worker receives – and how these wedges vary internationally and over time. Since capital income is always more concentrated than labour income, the relative taxation of the two factors of production is closely linked to the overall progressivity of the tax system.”

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From Noahpinion:

“Some people are going to see this post as premature. Though the Ukrainians have turned the tide against the Russian invaders, the outcome is still in doubt, and much destruction still lies in the future. But at this point it seems likely that a country called Ukraine will survive this conflict, with most or all of the territory it possessed before Putin invaded. So it’s time to start thinking about reconstruction and growth after the war’s end.

Certainly after the shooting stops, the first order of business — and the task of several years — will be to rebuild the parts of the country torn down by Putin’s assault. Cities like Mariupol and Kharkiv are being reduced to rubble, much of the country’s infrastructure is being torn up, and about a quarter of the entire population has been displaced. It took Japan and Germany both slightly over a decade after the end of WW2 to reach the level of income they had enjoyed before the war. Ukraine hopefully won’t be in quite such bad shape after this conflict, but this isn’t going to be the kind of thing a country bounces back from in 1 or 2 years.

Ukrainians will work very hard to rebuild their country, but they’re going to need help. And given the U.S. and Europe’s copious military assistance, it seems likely that they’ll offer rebuilding assistance as well. In fact, the EU has just started setting up a postwar reconstruction fund, and the U.S. has already spent $13 billion helping the Ukrainians. Both the U.S. and EU leadership know that they can’t afford to have a weak, economically backward Ukraine as the first line of defense against a newly malevolent Russia, and the Ukrainians’ cause has resonated deeply with the U.S. and EU populations alike. So expect copious economic aid to flow for at least a decade.

But aid alone doesn’t build a country into an economic powerhouse. We Americans tend to think that the Marshall Plan was how Germany rebuilt its economy after WW2, but in fact this only provided a small initial kick — most of West Germany’s economic rise in the mid and late 20th century happened via its own investment and industrialization, helped by favorable trade treaties with allied countries. Ditto for Japan.

And Ukraine really needs to build itself into an economic powerhouse. Russia has four times Ukraine’s population; having a higher GDP than a sanctions-stricken postwar Russia would help Ukraine even up the balance of power a bit. Remember that before the war, Ukraine’s economy had languished for three decades, with living standards well below those of Poland, Russia, or even Belarus:”

Continue reading here.