The Unassuming Economist

From Branko Milanovic:

“To think correctly about globalization one needs to think of it in historical context. This means seeing today’s globalization and its effects, positive and negative, as in many ways a mirror-replay  of the first globalization that took place from the mid-19^th century to the First World War.

That globalization, underpinned by the Industrial Revolution in Western Europe, transformed the economic map of the world by making Europe much richer and politically and militarily more powerful than any other part of the world. It allowed European countries, and later the United States, to conquer most of Africa and significant parts of Asia, which even when they were not formally ruled by Westerners were subjected to their strong influence in terms of economic policy (opening to trade, control of custom revenues), or even juridical extraterritoriality for European citizens.

Advanced European countries became much richer, so that by 1914 the ratio of per capita income, according to the Maddison project database, between the UK and China was 8 to 1 compared to 3 to 1 one century earlier. (The figure below shows the reverse of this ratio: Chinese, Indian and Indonesian GDP per capita as percent of comparable West European GDPs per capita. It thus highlights the recent rise of Asian countries.) Moreover, the fruits of industrialization and globalization began to be spread across Western countries’ income distributions thus making even the poor people there richer than almost all Africans and most Asians. European dominance allowed it to “export” its surplus population and to blunt the edge of the incipient class  conflict.

This very short sketch of the well-known effects of the first globalization allows us  to remind ourselves of both its positive and negative sides: huge technological progress as against exploitation, increased incomes for many vs. grinding poverty and exclusion for others, European mastery of the world vs. a colonial status of Africa and much of Asia.

In what ways should it inform our thinking about the current globalization? First, in making us realize that broad historical movements cannot bring only benefits to everybody. Some will inevitably lose, others gains; and at times the loss of some is a condition for the gain of others. Second, thinking of the past enables us to see how the current globalization is in many respects a mirror-image of the first—but shorn of its more brutal effects of conquest and exploitation.”

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From a new VOX post:

“Despite the growing importance of inequalities in policy debates, it is still difficult to compare inequality levels across European countries and to tell how European growth has been shared across income groups. This column draws on new evidence combining surveys, tax data, and national accounts to document a rise in income inequality in most European countries between 1980 and 2017. It finds that income disparities on the old continent have increased less than in the US and shows that this is essentially due to ‘predistribution’ policies.”

“Figure 1 shows how bringing together surveys, tax data, and national accounts can greatly improve traditional survey-based estimates. In Poland, fiscal (pre-tax) top income shares obtained from Bukowski and Novokmet (2017) reveal a large and growing underrepresentation of top incomes in surveys. After correction, the top 10% pre-tax income share appears to be underestimated by more than 10 percentage points in 2017. By contrast, surveys are more efficient at measuring top incomes in Denmark, but accounting for the large share of undistributed profits accruing to resident households (more than 8% of GDP in recent years) leads to important upward revisions of inequality at the top end.”

From a new VOX post:

“A growing number of companies place a high priority on the wellbeing of their workers, assuming that happier workers will lead to improved productivity. This column examines this link based on a meta-analysis of independent studies accumulated by Gallup, covering the wellbeing and productivity of nearly 2 million employees and the performance of over 80,000 business units, originating from 230 independent organisations across 49 industries in 73 countries. The results suggest a strong positive correlation between employee wellbeing, productivity, and firm performance.”

“Figure 1 presents our main finding – it shows true score correlations between employee wellbeing (measured as employees’ satisfaction with the firm as a place to work), employee productivity, and firm performance as means, taken across all industries and regions. We focus on four key performance indicators, arguably the most important ones from a business perspective: customer loyalty, employee productivity, business unit profitability, and staff turnover.”

From a VoxEU post by Alan Benson, Danielle Li, and Kelly Shue:

“The Peter Principle states that organisations promote people who are good at their jobs until they reach their ‘level of incompetence’, implying that all managers are incompetent. This column examines data on worker- and manager-level performance for almost 40,000 sales workers across 131 firms and finds evidence that firms systematically promote the best salespeople, even though these workers end up becoming worse managers, and even though there are other observable dimensions of sales worker performance that better predict managerial quality. 

In 1969, Laurence Peter and Raymond Hull publishedThe Peter Principle, proposing a farcical theory of organisational dysfunction. The Peter Principle, they explain, is that organisations promote people who are good at their jobs until they reach their ‘level of incompetence’. Fifty years later, Peter and Hull may find plenty of examples of people who occupy important managerial positions because of success in some radically different arena.

In principle, there’s nothing wrong with putting successful people into the highest positions. If the best basketball player makes the best coach, then a coaching position may be the best way to magnify that person’s talents. Similarly, if success in movies or real estate translates into success in governing, then the biggest moguls should occupy the highest offices.

The crux of the Peter Principle is that success in one arena doesn’t necessarily translate to the next, though promotion decisions are often based on a worker’s aptitude in their current position, rather than the one he or she is being promoted to perform. It’s no wonder that the Peter Principle is especially well-known in technical fields – from engineering, medicine, and law – where cases of poor managers who were once excellent individual contributors abound.

If it is accurate, then the Peter Principle bodes poorly for organisations, in light of a growing body of research documenting the important role that good managers play in building and sustaining productive organisations. Lazear et al. (2015), for example, find substantial variation in the quality of individual bosses, with the best bosses increasing the output of their subordinates by more than 10% relative to the worst bosses. Similarly, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) show that variation in management practices can explain much of the overall variation in firm productivity across countries. These papers suggest that firms face potentially large productivity losses when they promote workers who lack managerial ability.”

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From a VoxEU post by Barbara Biasi:

“Rates of intergenerational mobility vary widely across the US. This column investigates the effects of reducing differences in revenues and expenditures across school districts within each state on students’ intergenerational income mobility, using school finance reforms passed in 20 US states between 1986 and 2004. Equalisation has a large effect on mobility, especially for low-income students. The effect acts through a reduction in the gap in inputs and in college attendance between low-income and high-income districts.

There are large differences in intergenerational income mobility across US states and local labour markets. The probability that a child born into a family in the bottom quintile of the national income distribution will reach the top quintile during adulthood is 14.3% in Utah, but only 7.3% in Tennessee (Chetty et al. 2014).

But we do not know much about which factors make a place successful at generating high income and intergenerational mobility. High-mobility places tend to have:

• low income and racial segregation,
• low inequality,
• high social capital, and
• better schools (as proxied by test scores; see Chetty et al. 2018).

These patterns suggest that institutions and public policies have a role in promoting mobility. This cannot, though, be interpreted as a causal relationship.

The first step to mitigating these differences and improving mobility is to nderstand the role of public policies. Recently I examined the causal role of school finance equalisation – a reduction in the differences in public school revenues and expenditures across school districts in a state – on the intergenerational mobility of students exposed to different types of funding plans while in school (Biasi 2019).

US schools were historically funded mostly from local levies such as property taxes, and so wealthier districts (with a larger tax base) were able to spend more per pupil than poorer districts. A funding formula expresses each district’s revenues as a combination of state funds and local levies, and it allocates state aid to each district. In an attempt to equalise expenditure and guarantee equal opportunities to all children, over the past 40 years states have reformed their school finance schemes through changes to these funding formulas.

School finance equalisation reforms have varied across states and over time, although sharing a common objective, As a result, reforms in the same state, implemented under the same name, and with the same objective have had different effects on both the level and the distribution of school expenditure across districts.”

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